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Introduction
In the summer of 2003 the United States found itself embroiled in a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq. This was not the fight we chose, but it is the one that found us. As major combat operations in Iraq demonstrated, the United States military has an unparalleled capability to wage traditional warfare. These forces, however, were neither trained nor equipped to wage the counterinsurgency with which they were faced. Where our strategy has succeeded it has not been due to the strength or our doctrine, preparation or training. The many coalition successes have been forged by adaptable leaders and the dedicated efforts of thousands of Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, Marines and Coalition partners. The growing emphasis on Irregular Warfare (IW) since
2003 is acknowledgement that we do not wish to repeat this steep learning process in the future.
Although we perhaps could not have foreseen the insurgency that developed in Iraq, we could have predicted the need for an IW capability. Irregular warfare has a long military tradition. America, in fact, was born of Irregular Warfare against Great Britain. In the twentieth century we gained extensive experience in IW as the American military developed counterinsurgency doctrine and capabilities in the Philippines, Central America, the Caribbean, France, Burma and Vietnam. In these conflicts we developed and often re-invented effective IW tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). Further, our traditional warfare dominance virtually guaranteed our enemies would adopt asymmetric strategies. 
Irregular Warfare
IW focuses on the control of populations, not on the control of an adversary's forces or territory. ~ Joint Publication 1, pg I-7
Joint Publication 1-02 defines irregular warfare as:
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy And influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary"s power, influence, and will. "relevant" or target population rather than a fielded force. 3 Its strategic purpose is "to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods." 4 The primary target, then, is the will of the people.
Toward that end kinetic effects can be counter-productive. As stated in Air Force Foreign
Internal Defense doctrine:
In counterinsurgency, civilian security and stability are of utmost importance. Air strikes are significantly restricted in order to limit collateral damage-a factor that can alienate a population and increase sympathies for the insurgents, as well as weaken domestic and international political support. air support role. Airpower also provided a critical ISR role. The most common and effective use of airpower in all cases, however, was in the various air mobility roles. Lastly, it appears clear that the use of the military instrument alone was ineffective in the conduct of these irregular conflicts.
Airpower in Irregular Warfare
Marine Corps Small Wars Experience
By 1940 issue of combat operations. In these, despite the relative infancy of aviation, the use of airpower received equal billing with other military capabilities.
The role of CAS is highlighted without making excessive emphasis. One is advised that the inclusion of combat aircraft, if available, "may be advisable." 17 The doctrine does not assume air superiority in all cases, but characterizes small wars as being largely devoid of airborne threats. In the absence of such threats, combat aircraft can be dedicated to support of ground troops. In addition to convoy escort and route reconnaissance, attack or light bombardment aircraft should be employed as an airborne reserve. The intent is that these aircraft can be unleashed, but only upon positive identification of appropriate targets. This, in essence, is the equivalent of modern day Time Sensitive and On Call Targeting.
The Manual identifies the requirement for ISR assets to be twice that of "normal operations." 18 The need for actionable intelligence is recognized as a critical enabler in IW. The difficulty in obtaining such information is compounded by the population-centric nature of the conflict and the battle for perceptions. The Manual observes that "operations are based on information which is at best unreliable, while the natives enjoy continuous and accurate
The most critical element of airpower in this analysis, however, is transport aircraft. If aviation is to be a successful element of an IW campaign, it is transport aircraft that will make it so. Observing that small wars rarely occur in developed countries, the Manual advises one to expect an austere environment often lacking in the infrastructure required to move men and machines. The need for, and multi-faceted utility of, the transport aircraft makes it "indispensable" in these conditions. 20 Missions such as transportation, supply and evacuation will be paramount. Reading between the lines, it is clear the missions described directly equate to modern-day infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and casualty evacuation by way of air drop and air land tactics.
The basic roles and missions assigned airpower in the Small Wars Manual match those lessons of colonial policing actions. Attack aircraft were highlighted as playing a small but often crucial role especially when used for CAS. Aircraft used in an ISR role could play an essential role in finding and fixing the enemy. The most critical use of aircraft, however, was in the multi- The Air Commandos were also the first to employ helicopters in combat. Such innovative use of airpower enabled a freedom of maneuver otherwise prohibited by the expansive Burma jungle.
It had the added psychological impact of giving hope to the jungle soldiers. Hope of seizing the initiative, hope of being resupplied, and hope that timely medical attention awaited the injured. Through innovation limited resources were maximized, the tyrannies of distance and access were overcome, and initiative was made possible.
This same spirit of innovation is a driving force in today"s Army. One of the four pillars of the Army Posture Statement is Transformation. Key goals for this effort include modernizing equipment; instituting organizational change to enable modularity and versatility; and developing agile, adaptive leaders. 21 The Army"s holistic approach is broader than just developing new hardware. It also includes innovations in training, tactics, processes and institutions. Just as innovation bred success for the Chindits in Burma, today"s U.S. Army breeds future success on the battlefield through constant innovation and transformation. The Department of Defense must embrace this same spirit in building a national IW capability.
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES
A recent successful example of counter insurgency and counter terrorist strategy is the indirect approach of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-P). Here Army Special Operations CH-47s were crucial in providing air mobility and Navy P-3 and small unmanned aircraft provided critical ISR. The defining characteristic of this campaign, however, has been the lack of direct U.S. combat. Although airpower has been used to good effect, it has Where once the people supported rebels and extremists because they felt neglected or oppressed by the government, the delivery of their basic needs Lastly, of the 15 U.S. casualties sustained thus far in OEF-P only one was linked to terrorist activity and none have been related to combat.
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The FID-centric mission of OEF-P has been highly successful despite the absence of kinetic activity by U.S. forces. The effort has featured a holistic strategy, relatively low U.S.
footprint, and a high degree of interagency unity of effort. Although this template will not directly transfer to all IW settings, it suggests such an indirect approach centered on empowering the population and removing root causes of insurgency is highly effective.
Summary of Airpower use in Irregular Warfare
Airpower has made significant contributions to the conduct of Irregular Warfare and will continue to do so. It has been used to good effect almost since its inception. Through the years new technologies have enabled quantum leaps in aircraft performance and weapons accuracy.
Creative Airmen are finding new ways to employ existing equipment with stunning regularity. 
IW Doctrine Development
In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly…usually wins. Counterinsurgencies have been called learning competitions.
~ Field Manual 3-24, pg ix
The development of IW doctrine for airpower has not followed its many effective uses.
Although airpower has been an important part of many IW campaigns through the years, the USAF has been slow to develop a cogent body of doctrine and expertise. Despite extensive use of airpower in irregular ways in Northern Europe and Burma, the failure to codify our experience resulted in little lasting imprint after World War II. Hence, the USAF entered Vietnam with little dedicated IW capability and less doctrine. During Vietnam airpower was used extensively in support of our counterinsurgency efforts. Yet after the war our capability was largely abandoned and any lessons learned once again failed to find a resting place in doctrine. In the 1980s the issue was addressed in terms of Low Intensity Conflict. In the 1990s it was addressed in terms More than doctrine will be required to build a capability. The Army and Marines have always emphasized doctrine. The Air Force, on the other hand, has traditionally emphasized tactics, techniques and procedures. The inclusion of doctrine in formal flying training programs has been almost non-existent. If Air Force members have been exposed to doctrine at all it has rarely been beyond their field of expertise. One Air Force officer described his 21 year flying career as "entirely devoid of any exposure to doctrine through formal training programs."
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Hence, although common doctrine is an important starting point it must be pushed to all facets of training and education as depicted in Figure 2 to yield a transformation of service thinking. 
Configuring US Air Force Capabilities for IW
The United States will require a credible IW capability well into the future. IW is the realm of influencing people. The military instrument of national power plays a crucial role in IW, but it is in coordination with other instruments of national power in pursuit of political objectives. In this endeavor kinetic options by U.S. forces are often counter-productive. Given these boundaries, airpower will play a critical role in any successful IW effort. The recent release of DoD Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare, may hasten the development of a joint, interagency IW capability. In the haste to move forward, the Services must not become fixated Insurgencies are currently in progress or deemed likely in over 60 countries. 41 In many of these cases a credible IW air power capability may be the decisive factor in government victory or defeat. Our role is not to fight their fight, but to empower our partners with the capability to achieve their own victories. Our assistance will be critical to building their joint warfighting capability. This will require the development of air forces almost from the ground up. The scale and likelihood that we will continue to face such irregular challenges demands more than one USAF squadron can provide. Indeed, it may demand more than one IW Wing can provide. members working to solve difficult problems. We must use our hard-earned, recently re-learned IW capability as a springboard to build future capability. Any capabilities must be linked by doctrine to the nation"s political objectives in a way that strengthens the host nation"s "little trinity" of people, government and military.
Organizational Options
The nation requires an enduring IW capability and the USAF will be an important part of whatever form that may take. The USAF contains effective IW capabilities and is proving that fact daily in both OIF and OEF. It does not, however, have a dedicated and enduring capability.
Whether the Department of Defense decides to present its IW capability in the form of a Joint Task Force (JTF) supported by an Air Expeditionary Force, or in a smaller JTF headed by a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) augmented with conventional Air Force elements, it will need those trained and prepared to execute IW. Undoubtedly both approaches will continue to be used. In either event, it is imperative such forces organize, train, equip, educate and exercise as they intend to fight. An organizational framework is required if this is to happen effectively.
In While a full discussion of the forces and authorities required for such an approach is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible to point out some of the general advantages and disadvantages of this proposed solution. SOCOM already contains the closest approximation of forces and capabilities best suited for the conduct of IW. All of SOCOM"s core missions support the conduct of IW. Further, almost all of the required capabilities already exist within Special
Operations Forces. SOF are highly credible, imminently capable, inherently joint, regionallyfocused and culturally sensitive. Additionally, highly effective command and control frameworks and mechanisms are already in place. However, with the addition of forces and missions the span of control will grow ever larger. Such expansion may also result in diffusion of focus as traditional SOF and new mission interests compete. In the resource constrained environment the military is sure to face competition for resources will be fierce, even within Combatant Commands. The largest drawback, and the one that will be most hotly contested, is that the DoD will have to shed capability elsewhere to build a dedicated IW capability anywhere.
Recommendations
Warfare that has the population as its "focus of operations" requires a different mindset and different capabilities than warfare that focuses on defeating an adversary military.
~ Joint Publication 1, pg I-7
IW is not the be-all, end-all and is not the only form of warfare for which the United
States must be prepared. The US must retain a robust capability to conduct traditional warfare.
It is clear, however, the US requires an enduring IW capability well into the foreseeable future.
The military"s search for enduring IW capabilities must achieve balance. The following recommendations are a first step in that direction.
Organize the Force for Balanced Capability: Organize, Train, Equip
Effective IW efforts cannot succeed as an "ad-hocracy." Defining force structure is beyond scope of this paper, but must be done. Beginning with the next Quadrennial Defense
Review, a national decision must be made on the size and shape of the United States" IW capability. A holistic solution will require careful mission analysis that balances risk and requirement. A credible capability must include full interagency participation. It must also include personnel specifically trained and educated in IW skill sets. An enduring capability must also include recognition, management and career advancement opportunities for these personnel.
As mentioned previously, this is a national capability that exceeds any single Service"s ability to solve.
There are templates in existence which could serve as a model for building an IW capability. The CAFTT and the 6 th SOS may serve as partial templates. Additionally, AFSOC has defined a template for the IW wing concept. A possible solution from an air perspective may include standing up one or more IW wings. A more holistic solution may be to assign the mission to USSOCOM and resource it accordingly. Both approaches have inherent benefits and
costs. An IW wing would provide rapid deployment of regionally-focused professionals for both routine and crisis response purposes. Similarly, assigning the mission to USSOCOM would bring to bear a core of highly capable, inherently joint forces steeped in the skill sets required.
Either approach, however, will come at the expense of other capabilities within the DoD. The final solution will come only after sufficient mission analysis and difficult resourcing decisions.
Integrate Doctrine
Although the varied capabilities and perspectives of the Services are important elements of a Joint capability, they must all serve the same end state. The USAF"s view on IW and doctrinal foundations thereof must be congruent with that of the other Services. Congruent
Service doctrine must be forged in a common effort with shared timelines. Thenceforth, the USAF must embed such elements of common IW doctrine as are appropriate throughout the AF family of doctrine.
Educate, Train and Exercise
To be effectively employed, common doctrine must be reflected in all Service and Joint education, training and exercise venues. A culture change is required to move away from the USAF"s kinetic-centric focus. Such change will only result from a comprehensive approach to building IW capability. With force structure and doctrine defined, there must be more robust mechanisms to train and assess Air Force members to doctrinal standard. Individual competence and joint interoperability must be achieved through recurring Joint exercises. Even more than in conventional combat operations, the importance of training as you intend to fight will be crucial to IW success.
Conclusion
Irregular Warfare has endured through the centuries. The latter half of the twentieth century alone witnessed 89 cases of counterinsurgency. 42 Aside from the current conflicts, the United States can expect to face this style of warfare in the future perhaps with increased frequency. The nation requires an enduring capability to succeed in this operating environment.
Changes in force structure, doctrine, education, training and exercises will be required and work must begin immediately. This will be a daunting task. It will, however, build on the excellent personnel and capabilities already resident in the United States Military. The end result will be a coherent, sustainable national IW capability.
42 David Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means, 373.
